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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHAD E. BENNION,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Appeal No. 20070191-CA
District Case No. 964903735

vs.

CHRISTINE BENNION (HESS),
Respondent/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT ADEQUATELY MARSHALS THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL.
Christine Bennion, Appellee (hereinafter "Hess"), argues throughout her Brief of

Appellee that Chad Bennion, Appellant ("Bennion") has incorrectly cited various
portions of the Utah Code. Hess relies on statues that went into effect during 2007. The
statues Bennion relied upon in his opening brief were from 2006 or earlier, which are the
statues in effect at the time of trial in the instant matter. Hess is clearly mistaken in her
citation to statutes not in effect at the time of the trial in this matter, as this Court is
aware.
Hess further argues in the Brief of Appellee that Bennion failed to marshal the
evidence necessary to challenge the trial court's conclusion that Hess was entitled to an

award of child care expenses. Brief of Appellee at pp. 8-9. While Bennion argued in Brief
of Appellant that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding such compensation to
Hess, he has still marshaled the necessary evidence to challenge the award as he has
ferreted out the flaw in the trial court's application of the law in its Judgment regarding
the child care. Brief of Appellant pp. 9-12.
This Court has stated, "[w]hen challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against
the clear weight of the evidence." Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT 503, H 11, 128 P.3d
63, citing 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,^ 69, 99 P.3d 801. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that, to attack a trial court's finding of fact, "an appellant must
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most
favorable to the court below." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ^j
21, 54 P.3d 1177 citing Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d
766, 773 (Utah 1995); see also Consolidation Coal v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886
P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Reid v.
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). Marshaling the evidence to
attack a trial court's factual findings is a heavy burden. See id This same case continued
as follows:

2

In some instances, as in this case, an appellant, in attempting to meet its
marshaling burden, also might assert that the record does not contain any
evidence in support of a particular finding of fact. Under such
circumstances, the heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence in
support of the finding of fact does not shift to the appellee in order to refute
the appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence. Rather, the appellee,
when confronted with such a "no evidence" sufficiency challenge, need only
point to a scintilla of credible evidence from the record that supports the
finding of fact in order to overcome the appellant's "no evidence" assertion
and to demonstrate that the appellant has failed to meet its marshaling
burden.
Id at ^| 22 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, Bennion set forth Hess' testimony at trial in Brief of Appellant
which is also supported by the record. Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-11. The record has also
been submitted to this Court for review; however, Bennion's citation to the record and his
submission of relevant exhibits in his opening brief supports his position that the trial
court erred in its determination that Hess was entitled to an award for child care. Hess
failed to provide written notification to either Bennion or the trial court regarding
whether she was at school or work during the time that Bennion and Hess' two (2)
children (hereinafter the "Children") were in child care. Furthermore, Hess should have
been required to provide the written verification pursuant to the Decree and UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-45-7.16; Bennion argues that therein lies the trial court's error in its
Judgment. While Hess testified that she never had the Children in child care unless she
was at work or school, she did not provide written documentation to the trial court to
support her contentions. By failing to do so, Hess failed to meet the appropriate standards
as argued in Brief of Appellant which, in its acceptance of Hess' failure, led to the trial
3

court's error in its award of child care fees to Hess. Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-12.
Therefore, Bennion has adequately marshaled the evidence necessary for this
Court to review the trial court's error. Beus at ^| 11 & Wilson Supply at U 21. Bennion has
set forth the evidence in the Brief of Appellant that supports his claim that the trial court's
award of child care expenses was "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight
of the evidence" in that there was no evidence presented that supported Hess' contentions
at trial. Beus at ^| 11. Furthermore, while Bennion has a heavy burden to meet in his
claim, Hess has not cited to the record or provided any kind of evidence that supports the
trial court's award in her favor. Hess cannot point to any credible evidence that she was
entitled to child care expenses except for her own testimony and questionable receipts,
which will be addressed below. Wilson Supply at ^] 22. Therefore, Hess has failed to
counter Bennion's argument that the trial court erred in its determination of child care
fees to Hess inasmuch as Bennion has marshaled the necessary evidence to support his
claims on appeal.
IL

HESS' TESTIMONY WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE AND THUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO
SUBMIT WRITTEN VERIFICATION AS REQUIRED IN THE DECREE
AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16.
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that she was not required to provide written

verification of her work and work-related schooling. Brief of Appellee at pp. 7-8. She
cited to the trial court's finding that her day care expenses were for basic day care only
and did not include any extracurricular or optional activities. However, this is not a

4

statement that was part of the record, rather it is a finding by the trial court. Brief of
Appellee at p. 3. Hess further argues that her testimony was sufficient due to the trial
court's ability to determine credibility. Id. at pp. 9-10. However, if Hess' testimony is the
only evidence that was presented at trial as to what her child care expenses were, it is
impossible for Bennion to rebut such testimony because it becomes a credibility
determination while only one party clearly has access to the evidence. Moreover, while
Bennion argues that Hess was required to provide written verification per the Decree and
UTAH CODE ANN § 78-45-7.16 and wherein lies the trial court's flaw, Hess9 testimony is
also insufficient pursuant to the best evidence rule.
UTAH R. EVID. 1002 sets forth the best evidence rule, stating, "[t]o prove the
content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute." The Utah Supreme Court has
said concerning the best evidence rule that, "[t]he purpose of this rule is primarily to
prevent mistake or fraud." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ^ 37, 17 P.3d 1110
citing 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1049, at 511 (1994); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1061
(1996); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence §
1002.03[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.1997); 4 Wigmore on
Evidence § 1179, at 417 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1972). The Court went on,
"[t]herefore, when the content of a document is material to the matter to be proved, the
original writing must be produced[.]" Id. citing Am.Jur.2d supra, § 1049, at 510; C.J.S.
5

supra, §§ 1057, 1059. The Utah Supreme Court has further explained that, "[t]he 'best
evidence' rule generally has come to denote only the requirement that the contents of an
available written document be proved by introduction of the document itself." Roods v.
Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah, 1982).
In the instant case, Hess testified that the necessity of placing the minor children in
daycare began in April of 2002 based upon her attendance at school, an internship, and
her full-time work post-graduation. Rl 116 at p.20. Hess presented receipts for child care
from June of 2002 through to the beginning of the year 2003. Rl 116 at p. 21. Bennion's
counsel objected to the receipts, saying some were illegible and that many of them had no
year written on them. Rl 11624. Bennion's counsel also objected saying that only her
testimony was offered to indicate that the receipts were actually sent to Bennion. Id.
Hess then produced more receipts from January 2003 through January 2006 for child
care. R1116 at p.26. Bennion's counsel again objected stating that the receipts were
supposed to be for child care, but that such receipts indicated they were program fees.
Rl 116 at p. 30. The receipts for the boy and girls club cannot be construed to be for day
care alone without further written evidence in support, since the boys and girls club does
offer other various and numerous activities.
Bennion argues that Hess was required by the Decree and UTAH CODE ANN § 7845-7.16 to provide written verification of all child care expenses. Brief of Appellant at pp.
9-12. Hess attempts to argue that her testimony that she was at work is sufficient enough
to justify an award in her favor. Brief of Appellee at p. 7. However, this stance must fail
6

pursuant to the best evidence rule, UTAH R. EviD. 1002. Bennion cannot adequately
rebut Hess' testimony without written proof or verification that Hess is not mistaken or
attempting to commit fraud. Gorostieta at ^j 37. Bennion cannot adequately rebut Hess's
testimony and meaningfully expect to raise a credibility determination when Hess is the
only individual with the evidence and has failed to produce it. Furthermore, Hess'
testimony is insufficient to justify the award absent the actual receipts from the
Children's daycare, of which Hess is presumed to be in possession. Hess cannot testify
that the documents she did not provide to the trial court were indeed receipts for child
care because those documents were more than likely available. Roods at 642. Therefore,
under the best evidence rule, Hess should have been required by the trial court to provide
written verification of her childcare expenses. Thus, the trial court erred in its acceptance
of only Hess' testimony to validate the documents.
III.

HESS' CONTRADICTION BETWEEN "OFFSET" AND GRATUITOUS"
CONCERNING INSURANCE PREMIUMS IS WITHOUT MERIT; IF
THIS IS A VALID CLAIM, HESS' RECOURSE WAS TO FILE A CROSSAPPEAL AND, SINCE NO CROSS-APPEAL WAS FILED, HESS IS
BARRED FROM ARGUING SUCH IN THE BRIEF OF APPELLEE.
UTAH R. APP. P. 4 (d) addresses how and when a cross-appeal may be filed:
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party
may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time
otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule,
whichever period last expires.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[a] [c]ross-appeal is a separate appeal raising
distinct issues for review, and thus, cross-appeal must be able to stand on its own,
7

independent of original appeal, because original appeal may become irrelevant through
mootness or voluntary dismissal." MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah, 1998) citing
UTAH R. APP. P. 37. The Utah Supreme Court has further held as follows:
The seminal case treating the issue of when a cross-appeal must be filed is
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538-39, 51 S.Ct. 243, 246, 75 L.Ed. 520
(1931). In brief, the Langnes doctrine requires litigants to cross-appeal or
cross-petition if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for the
purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening the rights of their
opponent. Id.; Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701
(Utah 1980). Conversely, if appellees or respondents merely desire the
affirmance of the lower court's judgment, they need not, and should not,
cross-appeal or cross-petition. "The practical justification for the rule is that
a party satisfied with the action of a lower court should not have to appeal
from it in order to defend a judgment in his or her favor on any ground no
matter what an adversary does." Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court
Practice 364 (7th ed. 1993).
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah,1996).
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that Bennion "gratuitously" covered the
Children under his insurance and was thus not entitled to any reimbursement for
supplying such insurance. Id at p. 12. Hess then contradicts herself by arguing that she
was denied payment for insurance premiums from 2004 to the date of trial at issue
herein, which constituted an offset determined and entered by the trial court. Id. at pp.
13-14. Hess then changes positions again by stating that the offset did not occur at all.
Id. It appears that Hess is arguing that Bennion was being gratuitous and then makes an
offset argument, causing Hess to completely contradicted herself. Bennion argued in
Brief of Appellant that the trial court did not grant him a credit or offset for maintaining
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insurance on the Children. Ibid, at pp. 12-15. As set forth below, Hess' contentions
counter what she contends to be the determinations of the trial court, which
appropriately could only have been raised in a cross-appeal. As such, Hess is barred
from raising such issue in Brief of Appellee.
Hess had not provided insurance for the Children as she was required to do under
the Decree. As Bennion testified to at the bench trial, he provided insurance for the
children because he cares about them and perceived that Hess was not in compliance
with the Decree. Rl 116 at p. 133. Bennion also testified that he had never received any
kind of reimbursement or credit for the premiums he had paid for the children. Id.
Paragraph 6 of the Decree states that any premiums or expenses not covered by
insurance should be shared equally by the parties. Hess herself did not provide the
insurance as the Decree required; instead, the Children were covered by her husband,
Steve's, insurance until he was laid off, then she found an individual policy for the
children through Blue Cross. Bennion argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
that determination since the Decree and pertinent statutes set forth that he should receive
a credit or offset for such payment. Brief of Appellant at pp. 12-15. Hess believes such
offset occurred in the trial court's denial of reimbursement to her for insurance
premiums paid from 2004 to the date of the trial in this matter. Thus, Hess' argument
concerning the insurance premiums expressly contradicts what she perceives as the
findings of the trial court. Such claims should have then been raised in a cross-appeal.
9

It is Bennion's position that he was denied either offset or credit for the insurance
premiums paid for the children and that the determination not to reimburse Hess for
premiums paid from 2004 to the time of trial was separate and distinct. Bennion should
receive at least a credit of one-half of the insurance premiums that he has maintained on
the minor children towards the judgment that was awarded to Hess for the insurance
premiums for 2002 and 2003. Paragraph 6 of the Decree does state that the insurance
premiums should be equally paid by the parties and does not specifically say that these
premiums are to be paid equally by the parties for the party who is responsible for
maintaining the insurance.
Since Hess did not file a cross appeal as required by rule, Hess is precluded from
raising a challenge to what she perceives is the determination of the trial court regarding
the "offset" for insurance premiums paid by Bennion. UTAH R. APP. P. 4(d). Hess raises
a separate issue for review in Brief of Appellee before this Court in arguing that Bennion
gratuitously covered the Children on his own but then states that the offset was granted
to Bennion by the trial court when it offset the premiums paid by Hess from 2004 to the
time of trial. Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-14. Since this is a claim that challenges the trial
court's determination concerning the insurance premiums, Hess cannot now raise such a
claim without having filed a cross-appeal concerning it and, since she did not, such
claim should be barred by this Court.
Hess raises a distinct issue for review in the Brief of Appellee and has failed to
10

appropriately contain such a claim within a cross-appeal. MacKay (holding that a crossappeal raises distinct issues for review). Clearly, Hess wishes to attack the judgment of
the trial court for the purpose of enlarging her own rights and/or to lessen the rights of
Bennion. South at 356. However, since Hess has failed to appropriately file and raise
such a claim within a cross-appeal, she can now only request this Court to affirm the
trial court's judgment and must now be satisfied with the trial court's judgment in this
matter. Id. Therefore, Hess cannot now raise a claim contrary to what she perceives as
the determination of trial court and should thus be barred from doing so by this Court.
Since the Decree requires the insurance premiums to be shared equally by the
parties and does not designate the party to incur the original cost, Bennion should
receive a credit towards the judgment for the 2002 and 2003 insurance premiums. The
trial court abused its discretion in determining that Bennion should not receive full credit
in the form of an offset for the insurance premiums paid by him for the Children
beginning in 2004 to the present. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16(4).
IV.

CHILD SUPPORT IS A BENEFIT OF THE CHILD; THUS, THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT VIOLATES BENNION'S OTHER THREE
CHILDREN'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WHICH RENDERS
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED.
In her Brief of Appellee, Hess misinterprets Bennion's argument by stating that

Utah's child support guidelines violate Bennion's equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. Hess misunderstands Bennion's
11

position. Bennion argues in Brief of Appellant that, because the trial court did not take
into consideration Bennion's other three (3) children from a subsequent marriage in its
determination of child support concerning the Children at issue herein, first and foremost,
those three (3) children's rights were violated under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-20.
Hess also argues that statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, but fails to
acknowledge that such presumption can be rebuttable. Brief of Appellee at pp. 16-19.
Furthermore, Hess argues that Bennion's claim faces five bars which it must overcome in
order for his equal protection rights to have been violated. However, Hess cites no legal
authority for such bars. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. Hess further argues that Bennion did
not raise the issue of the trial court making findings regarding the support of his three (3)
other children and how that should affect his child support obligations for the Children at
issue herein until his opening brief, and that it cannot now be addressed.
incorrect.

This is

Bennion clarifies below so as to further enlighten Hess for her future

responses.
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. IV states as

follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV

states as follows:

12

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
In Fauver v. Hansen, the Utah Court of Appeals set forth the following with respect to the
purpose of child support:
Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child support is an
unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered away by
the childfs parent or parents. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981);
Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979) (right to support
belongs to the child); State Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d
1310, 1311-12 (Utah 1976) (child support duty is continuing and right to
receive it is unalienable); Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah
1974) (a father cannot divest himself of the obligation to support, nor defeat
the child's right to support).
Ibid, 803 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App.,1990) (emphasis added). UTAH CODE ANN.

§

78B-i2-i05(i) states as follows: "Every child is presumed to be in need of the support of
the child's mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children." The
statute that Bennion asserts is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied sets
forth the factors the trial court must consider in determining an award of child support.
See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7. This Court has previously stated as follows:
When asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that, under the
facts of his particular case, ctthe statute was applied ... in an unconstitutional
manner." [State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f l n. 2, 993 P.2d 854]. In
13

contrast, "[w]hen asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not
only his own rights, but those of others who may be adversely impacted by
the statute in question." City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56,
119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). In making a facial challenge, the
challenger asserts that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that "'no set
of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.'"
Herrera, 1999 UT 64, T|4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854 (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d

697

(1987))(alteration in original).
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, f27, 100 P.3d 231. Concerning statutes and their
rebuttable presumption, this Court has said the following:
Under Utah's statutory child support scheme, the trial court is to apply the
child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support. UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 78-45-7.2(2)(a) (Supp.1994). "In order to rebut this statutory
presumption, the trial court must make a finding that use of the guidelines
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child." Hill
v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-45-7.2(3) (1992)).
Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 958 (Utah App., 1994). This Court has held that, "[i]n
order to rebut this statutory presumption, the trial court must make a finding that use of
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of the child." Hill
v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App., 1992) citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.2(3)
(1992). Furthermore, should a trial court find that deviation is appropriate, the trial court
14

is required to make appropriate findings. See, Boyce v. Goble, 2000 UT App. 237, ^ 21,
8 P.3d 1042 citing Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^|16, 974 P.2d 306 quoting Allred
v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah CtApp.1990). A trial court's failure to enter such
findings is beyond the discretion of the trial court. Id
In the instant case, Bennion was, in essence, requesting that the trial court deviate
from UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.7 due to his support of his other three (3) children.
However, Bennion could not provide to the trial court specific evidence as to the exact
amount of support of his other three (3) children because Bennion's temporary orders
regarding their support were pending. Bennion did testily, however, that he has three (3)
other children besides the Children at issue herein, who also are entitled to his support.
Throughout the proceedings, Bennion objected to the trial court choosing not to deviate
from UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 in its determination of child support. The trial court
chose to reserve those issues as well as the constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 7845-7.7 for appeal. As is evidenced supra it was perfectly within the rules for Bennion to
raise this issue in his opening brief
In Brief of Appellee, Hess makes a general argument as to why statutes enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality. Id. at pp. 15-20. However, when a trial court modifies
an order of child support, the trial court is required to apply the child support guidelines
as a rebuttable presumption pursuant to Utah's statutory child support scheme. Brooks at
958.

Furthermore, the presumption of constitutionality does not render a statute
15

unrebuttable or unchallengeable.

If this were the case, the system of checks and

balances upon which our government is based would be meaningless.
The trial court in this case misapplied UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 to Bennion's
case in light of Bennion's three (3) other children that require his support. Thus, the trial
court should have deviated from the statute and then undertaken an analysis of the eight
steps as contained within UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7.

Therefore, Bennion's

argument that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7 is facially unconstitutional or
unconstitutional as applied to his case is worthy of this Court's review as the trial court
erred in making its determination in light of Bennion's other children.
The child support award as ordered by the trial court violates Bennion's other
three (3) children's rights to an equal share of his support as applied and facially under
U.S. CONST. AMENDS IV and XIV and is thus unconstitutional. The trial court failed to
take into consideration the fact that Bennion has three (3) other children for which he
must provide support, thus an application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.7, which does
not take into account other children, is unconstitutional. Bennion provided adequate
assurances to the trial court respecting his other three (3) children. Rl 116 at p. 147.
However, this was not taken into consideration when the child support was calculated in
this matter, violative of the right his other three (3) children have to an equal amount of
support as the children at issue in this matter. See, Fauver v. Hansen, supra. Therefore,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-7.7 pertaining to the calculation of child support is
16

unconstitutional in that it does not consider those children whom a parent is required to
support that either live in their home or are the subject of temporary support orders. The
Child Support Worksheet supplied for matters such as these fails to consider either of
these circumstances, to the prejudice of Bennion in having to pay a greater percentage of
his income in support for all children involved than is required of any other person under
the child support laws.
Additionally, the trial court did not make any findings that supported its decision
not to deviate from UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.7. The trial court should have at least
made a finding that it tcwould be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest" of the
Children to deviate. Hill at 724. A trial court that decides to deviate must make specific
findings to support its deviation. See, Boyce at ^ 21. If a trial court fails to do so, it is
beyond the trial court's discretion. Id. Bennion argues that in light of his request for the
trial court to deviate, the Judgment should have included a finding as to why it did not
deviate. Therefore, Bennion's contention that the trial court erred in failing to deviate
has merit.
V.

BENNION'S APPEAL IS NOT "FRIVOLOUS" AND THEREFORE, HESS
IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, OR DAMAGES ON
APPEAL.
Throughout the Brief of Appellee, Hess argues that Bennion's appeal is frivolous.

Hess concludes that, since Bennion's appeal is frivolous, attorney's fees, costs, and
damages should be awarded to her. Brief of Appellee at p. 24. She argues that Bennion's
17

appeal is not based in fact, is unwarranted by existing law, and puts forth no good faith
arguments to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Id. Hess also seems to imply that
Bennion has caused unnecessary delay. Id. at p. 25. However, Hess has misapplied the
applicative law that would grant such relief on appeal; therefore, Hess' argument that
Bennion's appeal is frivolous is without merit and should be rejected by this Court.
UTAH R. APP. P. 10 (a)(2) states that a party may move this Court within ten (10)
days of filing the docketing statement "[t]o affirm the order or judgment which is the
subject of review on the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to
merit further proceedings and consideration by the appellate court[.]" U T R. APP. P.
33(b) also state as follows in pertinent part:
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of
delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
This Court has previously stated the following concerning frivolous appeals and
the sanctions that can result from such appeals:
The Utah Supreme Court recently described a frivolous appeal as "c[o]ne in
which no justiciable question has been presented and ... is readily
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever
succeed/" Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) {quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979)). Sanctions are appropriate for appeals
"obviously without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and
which result in the delay of a proper judgment." Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156,162 (Utah App. 1989). However, sanctions for filing frivolous
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appeals are "applied only in egregious cases, iest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" Id.
{quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App.1988)).
Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App.,1992).
In the instant case, Bennion has presented a meritable appeal before this Court, as
evidenced by its proceeding to briefing on the issues raised therein.

Bennion has

complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in his Brief of Appellant. Not only are
his arguments made with supporting case law that favor his positions, Bennion cites to
the record in his efforts to demonstrate that the trial court erred in its Judgment. Thus,
Bennion's Brief of Appellant cannot be found by this Court to be "frivolous."
Moreover, if Hess felt that this appeal was indeed "not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law" then she could have exercised her rights under UTAH R. APP. P. 10
(a)(2) to summarily dispose of the appeal. Hess did not exercise this option and, as was
clear to this court from the issues set forth in the docketing statement, the appeal
maintained merit and could thus not meet the "readily recognizable as devoid of merit in
that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed" criteria set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court in Hunt supra, to be categorized as "frivolous." Although Hess may disagree with
the issues raised, frivolity carries a much heavier burden than a simply show of
dissatisfaction by the opponent to the appeal.
Moreover, Bennion notes that any delay that has occurred in this case has been
caused by Hess. Hess made Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment in District Court and

19

requested two extensions to file her Brief of Appellee. Therefore, if anyone has caused a
delay in this matter it is Hess. Thus, Bennion cannot be found to have caused delay in the
appellate process of this case. UTAH R. APP. P. 33(b). While Bennion acknowledges that
Hess can request damages in the Brief of Appellee, Bennion argues that, if his appeal was
indeed frivolous, Hess should have filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to
UTAH R. APP. P. 10 (a)(2). See, UTAH R. APP. P. 33 (c)(1). However, Hess did not do so,
and cannot do so now as only jurisdictional arguments can be raised at any time. This
further supports that Bennion's appeal is meritorious.
Furthermore, Hess has not shown that Bennion's appeal is frivolous. Bennion
presents several justiciable questions on appeal, for example: Bennion argues that, due to
the trial court's failure to take into account his three (3) other children he is supporting,
those three (3) children's rights under UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV were
violated (see, Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-20); Bennion argues that, due to the trial court's
misapplication of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-.7.7, the statute is facially unconstitutional
or unconstitutional as applied in his case (see, Id); Bennion also argues that, the trial
court erred in accepting Hess' testimony as sufficient information with regards to child
care expenses pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16 when the Decree requires
written verification (see, id. at pp. 9-12); and Bennion further argues that the trial court
erred in not awarding him a credit or offset for the insurance premiums he paid for the
Children (see, id. at pp. 12-15). Farrell at 302. These justiciable questions are not devoid
of merit because Bennion cites to the record throughout his Brief of Appellant in support
20

of his arguments. Id. Furthermore, Bennion was able to rely upon supportive case law for
his arguments throughout his Brief of Appellant which he used to analyze the facts and
citations to the record. Thus, Bennion has presented this Court with a meritorious appeal
that presents justiciable questions which is prospective of a successful appeal. Id.
Therefore, since Bennion has presented this Court with a meritorious appeal,
sanctions are not appropriate in this case. Id. Damages in the form of attorney's fees and
costs on appeal can be awarded when an appeal is frivolous; however, Bennion's appeal
cannot be construed as frivolous as Hess contends. See, UTAH R. APP. P. 33.
Furthermore, sanctions for frivolous appeals are only applied in "egregious cases" which
Bennion's appeal cannot be found to be due to the deserving issues raised therein for this
Court's review. Farrell at 302. Hess has failed to show that Bennion's appeal is so
egregious that it would warrant such sanctions. Additionally, this Court should be
hesitant to grant such a request "lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal
erroneous lower court decisions." Id. However, as Hess has argued so zealously against
the issues presented herein, Bennion requests that should his appeal prevail that he be
awarded costs and attorney's fees. Alternatively, should this Court determine that Hess is
indeed entitled to attorney's fees, Bennion requests a hearing regarding the awarding of
attorney's fees pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 33(c)(3).
VI.

HESS FAILS TO SET FORTH SUFFICIENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES
FOR HER LEGAL ASSERTIONS; THUS SUCH LEGAL ASSERTIONS
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT.
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Throughout the Brief of Appellee, Hess sets forth legal assertions and assumptions
but does not support them with legal authority. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 5, 9, 10, 11,
14, 16, 22, & 23. Thus, Bennion argues that such assertions made by Hess should be
disregarded by this Court in its determination of this appeal.
UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (a) (9) states that an argument "shall contain the contentions
and reasons ... with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing
any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on." The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[i]mplicitly, rule
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this court is
not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah, 1998) (internal quotations omitted)
citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) quoting Williamson v. Opsahl 92
Ill.App.3d 1087,48 111. Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981).
This Court has held that, "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Marquez, 2002 UT App.
127, 16, 54 P.3d 637 citinz State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). This Court
continued, stating, "all briefs must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken,
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on motion or sua sponte by the court...." Id, citing State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,1 31, 973
P.2d 404 (declining to address arguments because of failure to comply with rule 24).
In the instant case, Hess sets forth legal assertions in her Brief of Appellee but
does not support the assertions with legal authority. Hess argues that the trial court, as a
fact finder, may not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of its discretion as a
credibility evaluator. Id, at pp. 9-10. Hess also argues that the trial court is given
deference on appeal with its determination. Id. However, both assertions are made
without supportive legal authority or citation. Hess argues that Bennion's claim on
appeal must fail for two (2) reasons. Id. at p. 11. Again, this assertion is made without
supportive legal authority. Hess further argues that Bennion is precluded from raising as
issue on appeal due to lack of preservation in the trial court below. Id. at p. 14. Again,
Hess fails to provide any legal authority for her legal assertion. Hess argues that Bennion
has raised in his opening brief issues not included in his docketing statement and should
thus be precluded from raising issues in his opening brief. Id. at p. 22. This legal
assertion is also made without any kind of legal authority and is also incorrect. UT. R.
APP. P. 9(g) specifically states that issues not raised in the docketing statement may be
raised on appeal, showing that Hess is completely mistaken in this argument, and she
would have know this was an incorrect argument had she attempted to find some legal
authority with which to support her argument.
Hess further argues that oral arguments should not be granted. Id at p. 23.
However, Hess' only citations are irrelevant since she failed to provide relevant legal
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authority that adequately reflects why this Court's determination would not be aided by
oral argument. Hess' Brief of Appellee fails to meet the requirements of UTAH R. APP.
P. 24 (a) (9). The Brief of Appellee does not contain contentions and reasons with
respect to the issues presented with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on. UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (a) (9). The Brief of Appellee contains several bold
statements that fail to adequately brief Hess' responses to Bennion's claims as raised in
his Brief of Appellant. Hess' legal assertions scattered throughout her Brief of Appellee
are unsupported by legal authority and has dumped the burden of research upon this
Court. Thomas at 305. Therefore, this Court should not address Hess' arguments in
response to Bennion's Brief of Appellant due to Hess' inability to adequately brief her
responses. Marquez at % 6. Since Hess' Brief of Appellee is not compliant with UTAH R.
APP. P. 24, this Court should disregard her arguments in response to Bennion's Brief of
Appellant. Id. Additionally, Bennion respectfully moves this Court to disregard Hess'
responses to Brief of Appellant due to Hess' non-compliance with UTAH R. APP. P. 24.
Furthermore, it is clear that Hess was unable to locate any authority to Bennion's
challenges based on her failure to cite any case law other than general procedural law
pertaining to marshaling the evidence, the Fourth Amendment, etc. Hess simply attempts
to persuasively argue against Bennion's much supported Brief of Appellant by using
colorful language that, in essence, says nothing against the supported challenges. Hess
also chose to focus on what she must erroneously perceive to be applicable 2007 statutes
when it is clear that those had not been passed by the Utah legislature and put into law
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until after the trial at issue herein. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 4. Thus, Hess' argument
that the cited statutes in Brief of Appellant were incorrect finds no merit in very basic
law. Additionally, the "frivolous appeal" issue raised in Brief of Appellee has only been
raised by Hess as a deterrent from an otherwise unsupported brief. Hess has no response
to the supported challenges and thus relies upon a last ditch effort to try and dismiss a
meritorious appeal. This Court should not allow Hess to intrude upon proper appellate
procedure in this matter and be allowed to prevail. Hess has failed to support her
position and this Court should give full faith and credit to Bennion's challenges as
properly brought in good faith. No sanctions have been requested in this matter because
such a challenge would clearly ring hollow and reflect poorly upon the opposition.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Bennion respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the Judgment in this matter and take any such further action as this Court
deems appropriate.
DATED, this 6th day of May 2008.

Michael J. Thompson
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
A
Decree of Divorce, dated May 19, 1998

FILED OlSTitJOT COURT
Third Judicial District

David R. Ward #3379
HUTCHISON, NEIDER, WARD & KING
Attorney for Respondent
5242 South College Dr., Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 268-9868

HAY 1 Q jqq$
S*i.7 L A K £ COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD BENNION,

)
DECREE OF DIVORCE
]

Petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTINE BENNION,
Respondent.

]|

Civil No. 964903735 DA

]1

Judge Glenn Iwasaki

The above-entitled matter having come before the Honorable
Glenn Iwasaki, Judge of the above-entitled Court, for entry of a
Decree of Divorce, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of

Law

herein

and

with

good

cause

appearing

therefor,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

Decree

of

Divorce

from

the

Defendant, the same to become final upon the signing and entry
hereof.
2.

Respondent is awarded the sole care, custody and control

of the parties' minor children, Aurora Bennion, born January 4,
1994, and Adria Bennion, born July 29, 1995, subject to, unless

otherwise agreed by the parties, reasonable visitation rights for
the Petitioner as the parties may agree, including, but not limited
to, the following:
a.

Three (3) two-week periods each year.

Each party

shall pay one-half of the cost to transport the children to
Salt Lake City and back.

The parties shall coordinate their

schedules to accommodate these visits, and Plaintiff shall
give Respondent at least a 30-day prior notice.
b.

Petitioner shall have visitation in California upon

a 30-day prior notice to Respondent, or shorter notice if
reasonable, so long as this does not interfere with plans that
Respondent already has.
3.

Petitioner is required to pay child support to Respondent

in the amount of $352.00 per month, continuing until the minor
children reach the age of 18 or graduate from high school with
their normal graduating class, whichever is later.

Petitioner's

income shall not be subject to income withholding pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 78-45-7 et seq. and 62A-11-401 et seq. and 501 et seq
unless he becomes more than 3 0 days delinquent

in his

support

obligation.

If automatic withholding does occur, an additional

$7.00

processing

check

fee

should

withheld each month.

2

be

included

in

the

amount

4.

Commencing April 1, 1998, Petitioner is required to pay

one-half (h)

of all reasonable child care expenses incurred while

working or while receiving occupational or career-related training.
Respondent shall provide to Petitioner written verification of the
cost

and

identity

of a child

care provider

upon

the

initial

engagement of the provider.
5*

The

Respondent

shall

be

allowed

to

claim

the

minor

children as dependents for tax purposes.
6.

Respondent

shall

be

required

to maintain

health

and

dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so long as
the same is available at a reasonable cost through her employment.
Commencing April 1, 1998, any premium for insurance coverage for
the children and all of the children's medical and dental expenses
not paid by insurance shall be shared equally by the parties.
1.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, Respondent shall

be required to provide verification of insurance coverage to the
Petitioner or to the Office of Recovery Services, if applicable, on
or

before

January

2nd

of

each

calendar

year;

furthermore,

Respondent shall be required to notify the Petitioner or the Office
of Recovery Services, if applicable, of any change of insurance
carrier, premium or benefits within thirty (30) days of the date
Respondent first knew or should have known of the change.
8.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, either party who
3

incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children shall be
required to provide written verification of the costs and payment
of such medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days
of payment.
9.

Neither party is required to pay alimony herein.

10.

The parties own certain household furnishings, furniture,

appliances and personal property, and it is reasonable that each
party should be awarded any such property which each presently has
in his or her possession, except that Respondent is also awarded
the following

items:

The cedar chest, oak closet

(3 pieces),

housewares (china, stemware, silverware, cookware) and one-half
of the collectibles*
within ninety

{\)

The collectibles shall be valued and divided

(90) days after entry of this Decree of Divorce,

except that Petitioner

shall have the option to keep

all

the

collectibles if, within that 90 days, he pays to Respondent the
value of her one-half (h)
11.

share therein.

The parties shall each be ordered to assume and pay the

debts incurred in their own names since the separation, and hold
the other harmless therefrom.

Further, the Petitioner is required

to assume and pay the obligations owing to Associates ($2,000), LDS
Hospital

($680),

($400), Selco

Gerald

Bennion

($7,100),

Stayner

Fitzgerald

($165) and any debts associated with the

floral

businesses, C & R Floral Wholesale and C & R Creations, owned
4

during the marriage.
12.

Each party is required to pay their own attorney fees and

costs incurred herein.
13.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other

such documents as are required to implement the provisions of the
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court,
is
DATED this

/ ^ - ^ d a y of M ^ u = b V l1998
BY THE COURT:

Judfcje Glenn K.Iwasaki
District Court Judge
Approved:

Clark R. Ward
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

d&

On the
day of March, 1998, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Clark R. Ward
Attorney for Petitioner
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 420
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
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Long Title. S.B. 23 Child Support
Guidelines, 2007 General Session, State
of Utah, Chief Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell

LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL
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1

CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

2

2007 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Chief Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell

5

House Sponsor: Lone D. Fowlke

6

==========^^

7

LONG TITLE

8

General Description:

9

S.B. 2 3

This bill updates child support guidelines and makes other corrections.

10

Highlighted Provisions:

11

This bill:

12

•

recalculates and updates the child support table amounts;

13

•

defines "temporary" as less than 12 months;

14

•

requires the use of the same table when adjusting child support amounts due to

15
16
17
18
19
20

aging out or death of a child; and
•

makes technical corrections.

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
This bill takes effect on July 1, 2008.

21

Utah Code Sections Affected:

22

AMENDS:

23

78-45-2, as last amended by Chapters 161 and 186, Laws of Utah 2000

24

78-45-7.2, as last amended by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah 2003

25

78-45-7.5, as last amended by Chapter 324, Laws of Utah 2006

26

78-45-7.7, as last amended by Chapter 255, Laws of Utah 2001

27

78-45-7.10, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 2006

S.B. 23

12-15-06 10:10 AM

28

78-45-7.14, as repealed and reenacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994

29

78-45-7.15, as last amended by Chapter 176, Laws of Utah 2003

30

78-45-7.16, as last amended by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994

31

78-45-7.21, as enacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1994

32
33

= = = = = = = = = ^
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

34

Section 1. Section 78-45-2 is amended to read:

35

78-45-2. Definitions.

36

As used in this chapter:

37

(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1).

38

(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services or the Department

39

of Human Services.

40

(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the Office of

41

Recovery Services, the Department of Human Services, or an administrative agency of another

42

state or other comparable jurisdiction with similar authority to that of the office.

43

(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered and is calculated

44

using the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.

45

(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child

46

support obligation table," "low income table," or "table" means the appropriate table in Section

47

78-45-7.14.

48

(6) "Child" means:

49

(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated,

50
51

self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the

52

normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting,

53

married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or

54
55
56

(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able
to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own means.
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in [Section 78-45-2]

57

this section, or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal

58

for the support of a child, including current periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue
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Bill Status Tracking Sheets,
Second Substitute S.B. 23 Child Support
Guidelines, 2007 General Session,
State of Utah, Bell, G.

S.B. 23 Second Substitute Child Support Guidelines (Bell, G.)
Date
11/16/2006
11/30/2006
12/15/2006
A o M o nnnc
12/18/2006
12/22/2006
12/27/2006
12/28/2006
1/12/2007
1/15/2007
1/15/2007
1/16/2007
1/16/2007
1/16/2007
1 /16/2007
1/17/2007
1/17/2007.
1/18/2007
1/18/2007
1/22/2007
1/22/2007
1 /22/2007
1/22/2007
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1/23/2007
1/23/2007
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1/24/2007
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Action
LFA/ bill assigned to staff for fiscal analysis
LFA/ bill sent to agencies for fiscal input
Bill Numbered but not Distributed
Numbered Bill Made Available for Public

Location
LRGC
LRGC
LRGC

Vote

LRGC

Djstrjbutj

LFA/ fiscal note sent to sponsor
LFA/ fiscal note sent to floor
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Senate/ received from Legislative Research
Senate/ read 1st (Introduced)
Senate/ to standing committee
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Senate/comm report/substitute
Senate/ placed on 2nd
LFA/ bill assigned to staff for fiscal analysis
LFA/ bill sent to agencies for fiscal input
Senate/ read 2nd
Senate/ substitute
Senate/ floor amendment
Senate/circled
Senate/uncircled
Senate/ pass 2nd
LFA/ fiscal note sent to sponsor
LFA/ fiscal note sent to floor
Senate/ to Printing with fiscal note
Senate/ read 3rd
Senate/ floor amendment
Senate/ pass 3rd
Senate/ to House with amendments
House/ received from Senate
House/ read 1 st time (Introduced)
House/ to standing committee
House Comm - Amendment Recommendation
House Comm - Favorable Recommendation
House/ comm report favorable/ amended
House/ read 2nd time
House/ read 3rd time
House/ circled

LRGC
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LRGC
SINTRO
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SSTJLC
SSTJLC
SSTJLC
SSTJLC
SSTJLC
SSUB
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S2ND
S2ND
S2ND
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S2ND
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S3RD
S3RD
S3RD
S3RD
S3RD
S3RD
HCLERK
HCLERK
HCLERK
HSTRUL
HSTJUD
HSTJUD
HSTJUD
HSTJUD
H3RDSB
H3RDSB
H3RDSB

23 6 0

26 3 0
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2/15/2007
2/27/2007
2/27/2007
2/27/2007
2/27/2007
2/27/2007
2/27/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
2/28/2007
3/6/2007
3/8/2007
3/9/2007
3/9/2007
3/19/2007

House/uncircled
House/ uncircled
House/ amended
House/ passed 3rd reading
House/ to Senate
Senate/ received from House
Senate/ placed on Concurrence Calendar
Senate/ concurs with House amendments
Senate/ failed
Senate/ under suspension of the rules
Senate/ motion to reconsider passed
Senate/ concurs with House amendments
Senate/ to House
House/ received from Senate
House/ signed by Speaker sent to Senate
Senate/ received from House
Senate/ signed by President/ enrolled
Bill Received from Senate for Enrolling
Draft of Enrolled Bill Prepared
Enrolled Bill Returned to House or Senate
Senate/ enrolled bill to Printing
Senate/ to Governor
Governor Signed

H3RDSB
H3RDSB
H3RDSB
SSEC
SSEC
SCURCAL
SCURCAL
SCURCAL
SFILE
SFILE
SCURCAL
HSPKR
HSPKR
HSPKR
SPRES
SPRES
LRGCEN
LRGCEN
LRGCEN
SSEC
SSEC
EGOV
LTGOV

39 34 2

12 14 3
12 14 3
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ADDENDUM
E
Order (September 05, 2007)
Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment, dated November 5, 2007

FILED DISTRICT COUBT
Third Judicial District

MICHAEL J. THOMPSON, 5901
Attorney for Petitioner
881 South Orem Blvd., Suite 1
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: 801-223-9044

5 2007
By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER
(September 05, 2007)

CHAD E. BENNION,
Petitioner,

tft>^70373r

vs.
CHRISTINE M. BENNION
(n.k.a. Christine Hess),

Civil No.

^064903272-

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

Respondent.

THIS MATTER came before the court on September 5 th , 2007, at the hour of
8:00a.m. before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge, on
Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Present were Petitioner Chad E.
Bennion represented by counsel, Michael J. Thompson and counsel for Respondent,
David R. Ward. Respondent, Christine Hess, was not present.
Having taken oral argument, heard the representations of the respective parties,
and considered the arguments presented by the parties' counsel, the Honorable Judge
Glenn K. Iwasaki enters the following orders:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Court does not fault Respondent for approaching the Court on

a Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment.
2.

As the Court received the document, there was the ability for the

Court to weigh the impact of the document (exhibit) and while the Court
was troubled by the lack of foundation as to any supporting documentation
to support the summary, there was no documentation available for the
Court to look at, the weight given to the document was diminimus
because of the lack of foundation.
3.

The Court does not mean to indicate that mere testimony or only

her testimony was used in a pejorative sense, but rather to emphasize the
lack of any documentation to support her testimony. So when the Court
indicated only her testimony, that's all that was there, it wasn't in a
pejorative sense, it was only as an emphasis on the lack of any
documentation.
4.

Accordingly, the Court after hearing argument and after being

reminded of the Court's former ruling and analysis maintains the original
position.

WHEREFORE, the Court enters the following Orders:

2

ORDER

1.

Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied.

2.

The parties are each to bear their own respective attorney's fees.

3.

Mr. Thompson is directed to prepare the appropriate order.

2007.

DATED ,this

Commissioner Patrick
Third Disfnct£ourt C#ml^agr

Judge Glenn K. I w a s a k i ^ ^ 0 J O
Third District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Attorney for Petttio?ieic-

Date

3

^^

NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7(F)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

TO CHRISTINE M. BENNION n.k.a. CHRISTINE HESS and DAVID R. WARD:
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of
the District Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order Prepared by the Respondent shall be
the Order of the Court unless you file an Objection in writing within five (5) days from the
date of the service of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing if sent by mail.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I [ ] hand delivered, [ ] sent via facsimile, [X] mailed, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order (September 05, 2007), on this 19th day of
October, 2007 directed to:
David R. Ward
Attorney for Respondent
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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